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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the adoption of legislation such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, a wage disparity
continues to exist between males and females, with women earning eightytwo cents for every dollar earned by a man under the raw gender-pay gap.1
Though the gap has narrowed in recent years, the reduction rate is
significantly lower, with little to show for it—a gap still exists.2
Because legislation intended to diminish the disparity is not
working, additional measures should be taken. Title VII and the Equal Pay
Act both prohibit sex-based discrimination in the payment of wages to male
and female employees. 3 Following the adoption of the Equal Pay Act
[hereinafter EPA], which includes four affirmative defenses, Congress
enacted the Bennett Amendment to Title VII, which has been interpreted as
applying those same defenses to claims brought under Title VII.4 Of the
four defenses available under both Title VII and the EPA, the fourth
defense, “factors other than sex” [hereinafter FOTS], has created significant
controversy among courts.5 Despite legislative efforts to universally define
FOTS, no such definition has been adopted. A more stringent interpretation
of the defense is therefore necessary to eliminate the still-prevalent pay
disparity.
The broad scope of this fourth affirmative defense available to
employers under the EPA and Title VII allows for inconsistency in its
interpretation and is responsible, at least in part, for the continued existence
of wage discrimination. Without a prescribed means of application—
specifically, a stricter means of application—employers are more readily
absolved from liability under the FOTS defense. The best solution to this
problem is for Congress to adopt a more stringent approach to the FOTS
defense under the Equal Pay Act of 1963—an approach which would apply
to Title VII, as well. However, with little headway being made in the
legislation regarding pay equity, this Comment proposes instead that courts
adopt the job-relatedness standard that multiple circuits already apply for
1

The
State
of
the
Gender
Pay
Gap
in
2021,
https://www.payscale.com/data/gender-pay-gap (last visited August 11, 2021). Under the
uncontrolled gender pay gap equation, accounting for additional factors besides gender,
including education, experience, location, and industry, women earn ninety-eight cents for
every dollar males earn.
2
Id.
3
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
4
Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1981).
5
Jack A. Friedman, Real Gender-Neutrality for the Factor-Other-Than-Sex
Defense, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 241, 242-43 (1994).
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the FOTS defense. Part II of this Comment explores the background of
discrimination laws in the United States and focuses on legislation, both
adopted and proposed, surrounding wage discrimination. Part III
specifically analyzes the requirements under the EPA’s burden-shifting
analysis, taking into consideration the Act’s legislative history and the lack
of consistency among circuit courts in interpreting the FOTS defense. Part
IV concludes by suggesting reformation for, and solutions to, ongoing wage
discrimination in America and urges that the FOTS defense be amended to
redefine FOTS.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was the first federal legislation to
address wage discrimination on the basis of sex.6 It was an amendment to
the Fair Labor Standards Act [hereinafter FLSA] and provides a more
narrow approach to discrimination in the workplace than the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.7 The purpose of the EPA amendment was “to prohibit
discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages by employers
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.”8 It is
widely acknowledged that the purpose of the Act is “to put an end to
historical wage discrimination against women.”9 The Supreme Court has
stated that “the [EPA] is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and
applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to
achieve.”10 As discussed below, if the FOTS defense is interpreted to easily
permit pay discrepancies, the EPA will not be fulfilling its goal of ending
wage discrimination against women.
The Act applies only to those cases in which a pay disparity exists
between men or women who perform work that is substantially equal in all
material aspects.11 Congress acknowledged at the outset of the proposed
amendment that the presence of wage differentials:
(1) depresses wages and living standards for employees
necessary for their health and efficiency; (2) prevents the
Ellen M. Bowden, Closing the Pay Gap: Redefining the Equal Pay Act’s
Fourth Affirmative Defense, 27 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 225, 229 (1994).
7
Id.
8
See Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1963).
9
Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 189
(U.S. 2020).
10
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974).
11
See, Bowden, supra note 6.
6
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maximum utilization of the available labor resources; (3)
tends to cause labor disputes, thereby burdening, affecting,
and obstructing commerce; (4) burdens commerce and the
free flow of goods in commerce; and (5) constitutes an
unfair method of competition.12
The bill sought to eliminate the disparity, proposing that the following be
added as § 206(d)(1):
no employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in
which such employees are employed, between employees
on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays
wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions,
except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex: provided, that an
employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation
of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the
provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any
employee.13
The EPA analysis is a burden-shifting analysis.14 According to the
language of the Act, in order for a plaintiff to make a case under the EPA,
he or she must show “that an employer pays different wages to employees
of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are performed under similar
working conditions.’”15 The plaintiff has the initial burden of proof which,
if met, shifts to the defendant-employer to raise one of four affirmative
defenses available as an exception to the general statutory provision.16 The
defendant has both the burden of proof and the burden of persuasion to

12

Id.
Id.
14
See Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 195-96.
13
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show that one of the four affirmative defenses applies to the claim. 17 In
asserting an affirmative defense to the employee’s prima facie case, the
employer must not only persuade a reasonable factfinder that the evidence
presented could explain the difference, but that the evidence does explain
the difference.18 It is important that the defendant employer demonstrate
that the raised defense is the reason for the pay disparity that exists between
male and female employees. 19 A claim brought under the EPA does not
require that discriminatory intent be shown—effectively making the EPA a
strict liability statute. 20
The Act lists the four exceptions that an employer may bring as
affirmative defenses: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; and (4) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex. 21 While the first three
affirmative defenses are more specific, the fourth affirmative defense leaves
room for interpretation by the courts.22 This lack of consistency leaves
plaintiffs uncertain of the outcome of a case brought under the EPA,
reducing the number of claims brought under the Act.23 Therefore, the
interpretation of this broader, fourth defense leaves much controversy
surrounding the effectiveness of the EPA in eliminating the gender wage
gap in the United States.
Like the EPA, Title VII to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
sex-based wage discrimination. 24 As discussed above, claims brought
under the EPA require a showing of equal work. 25 Conversely, Title VII
does not require proof of equal work.26 For this reason, at least in part, most
sex-based wage discrimination claims are brought under Title VII because
of a different and often lower burden of establishing a prima facie case by
the plaintiff. This only furthers the EPA’s failure in reducing the gap.27
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a broad scope of protection
for preventing discrimination based on race, sex, religion, color, and
national origin, providing that:

17

Peter Avery, The Diluted Equal Pay Act: How Was it Broken? How Can it be
Fixed?, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 849, 851 (2004).
18
U.S. EEOC v. MD Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2018).
19
Id.
20
See Avery, supra note 17.
21
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196.
22
See Bowden, supra note 6.
23
Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 233-34.
24
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166-67.
25
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
26
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168.
27
Id. at 170.
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[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.28
In order to bring a claim under Title VII, an individual plaintiff may
prove discrimination using either the disparate treatment or disparate
impact theory.29 However, because of broad interpretations of the defenses
to sex-based wage claims, the disparate impact theory may not be available
for these claims.30 This unavailability is based, at least in part, on the
interpretation of how Title VII intersects with the earlier EPA.
Initially, the proposed version of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only
applied to discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin,
but the bill was amended shortly before the floor vote to include
discrimination on the basis of sex as well. 31 When concerns surrounding
the relationship between Title VII and the EPA arose, the Bennett
Amendment was proposed to reduce the inconsistencies in interpretation. 32
The Bennett Amendment provides that:
[i]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of the wages or
compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the
provisions of section 206(d) of title 29. 33
In Washington County v. Gunther, the Court addressed the
relationship between the two pieces of legislation. 34 In Gunther, the Court
had to determine whether sex-based wage discrimination claims brought
under Title VII were limited only to those claims of equal pay for equal

28
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. As used in this context, an
employer is a person (1) who is engaged in commerce (2) with at least fifteen employees
(3) for each working day for at least twenty calendar weeks, either in the current or
preceding calendar year. Id. § 2000e(b).
29
Id. § 2000e-2.
30
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170.
31
Id. at 172.
32
Id. at 173.
33
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
34
Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167.
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work.35 The Court noted that where Congress has not explicitly provided
an interpretation, the courts should interpret Title VII broadly so that
discrimination may be reduced. 36 Consequently, the Court held that Title
VII does not preclude claims where equal pay for equal work is not shown,
concluding instead that the Bennett Amendment incorporated only the four
affirmative defenses available under the EPA into Title VII. 37
The Court reached this decision by determining that the phrase
“such differentiation is authorized” under the EPA38 was meant to
incorporate the affirmative defenses of the EPA into Title VII because this
pay differential was authorized.39 Since there is little legislative history for
the Bennett Amendment, the Supreme Court decided that the purpose of the
Bennett Amendment must have been to guarantee that courts interpreted
claims brought under both Title VII and under the EPA consistently. 40
Thus, the Court determined that Title VII, unlike the EPA,
does not require that a member of the opposite sex be paid a higher
wage than the individual bringing a discrimination suit for equal
work.41 However, because of the Bennett Amendment, the wage
rate may be based on “seniority, merit, quantity or quality of
production, or any other factor other than sex.”42
Circuit courts have interpreted the FOTS defense differently; some
have applied a gender-neutral test while others have applied a legitimate
business-reason test.43 Under the business-reason test, referred to in the
Ninth Circuit as the job-relatedness standard,44 the employer must show
that a factor other than sex which serves as a legitimate business purpose
led to the wage discrepancy. 45 Under the gender-neutral test, factors
determining wages need only be based on a facially gender-neutral factor
and applied neutrally to employees. 46 The Supreme Court has weighed in
favor of this interpretation in dicta. 47 In Gunther, as discussed above, the
defendant County of Washington argued that the Bennett amendment
35

Id. at 163.
Id. at 178.
37
Id. at 168.
38
Id. at 167.
39
Id. at 168-69.
40
Id. at 170.
41
Id. at 168.
42
Id.
43
See Avery, supra note 17 at 864-66.
44
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460.
45
Id. at 461; see Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
46
Id. at 462; see also Strecker v. Grand Forks Cnty. Soc. Serv., 640 F.2d 96 (8th
Cir. 1980).
47
See Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005); Gunther, 452 U.S.
at 172.
36
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required the plaintiff to prove equal work under Title VII as well as under
the EPA.48 One of the bases for this argument was that the first three
affirmative defenses are already available for Title VII claims and that the
fourth defense, FOTS, is implied in Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sex. 49 As noted, the Court disagreed with the County,
finding that the Bennett Amendment was intended to resolve conflicting
applications of Title VII and the EPA—regardless of the availability of the
same defenses in Title VII. 50 In addition, the Court said that adding FOTS
to Title VII might change how a sex-based wage claim is prosecuted under
Title VII cases—a decision they said they were not making. 51 However, in
citing an example of such a change, the Court implied that disparate impact
might not apply to a sex-based wage claim because FOTS could be a neutral
factor.52 This was clearly dicta because the decision did not depend on an
interpretation of FOTS.
In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court discussed FOTS
more explicitly and said—also in dicta—that because of the application of
the fourth affirmative defense, employers could rely on both reasonable and
unreasonable factors other than sex.53 In Smith, the plaintiff-employees of
the city of Jackson argued that the City violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 [hereinafter ADEA] because it gave greater salary
increases to younger police officers than those over forty years old. 54 In
their claim, the plaintiffs argued both a disparate-treatment and disparateimpact claim under the ADEA.55
The Court had to decide whether disparate impact applied at all to
the ADEA.56 In deciding this issue, the Court had to determine whether the
“reasonable factors other than age” [RFOA] defense for the ADEA meant
any neutral factor—which would preclude disparate impact—or whether
the factor had to be justified as reasonable. In concluding that disparate
impact applied to the ADEA, the Court acknowledged the difference
between the RFOA defense under the ADEA and the FOTS defense under
the EPA.57 The Court noted that the language of the ADEA’s RFOA
defense differs from the FOTS defense, which does not have

48

Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168 (1981).
Id. at 169-70.
50
Id. at 170.
51
Id. at 170-71.
52
Id. at 178-80.
53
See Smith, 544 U.S. at 239.
54
Id. at 230.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 237.
49
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reasonableness language. 58 The Court said in dicta that this indicated the
FOTS defense includes any factor other than sex, not only those factors that
are reasonably justified, as the RFOA would require.59
Because the Supreme Court has only opined on the meaning of
FOTS in dicta, the majority of the defense’s interpretations of FOTS have
been determined by the circuit courts, some of whom have decided that
FOTS means literally any factor other than sex, while others have applied
a more stringent test, requiring that the FOTS presented be job-related.
Expressing the first of these two views of FOTS, Kouba v. Allstate
Insurance Company, described in greater detail below, was frequently cited
as a case analyzing the FOTS defense as a defense requiring some
justification.60 However, Kouba was overruled in 2018 by Rizo v. Yovino.61
The appellate court in Rizo applied a stringent job-related
interpretation of FOTS, concluding without hesitation that FOTS includes
“legitimate, job-related factors such as a prospective employee’s
experience, educational background, ability, or prior job performance.”62
In overruling Kouba, the court noted that prior salary may not be used as a
factor, determining that the court in Kouba erred in allowing prior salary to
be considered a FOTS.63
In Rizo, the plaintiff was hired by the defendant’s school system as
a math consultant.64 Prior to being hired, the plaintiff had worked as a math
teacher in another school system and the defendant determined her new
salary using her prior salary as a basis. 65 Rizo filed suit claiming that she
was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, as she was paid less that
her male counterparts for equal work. 66 The court reasoned that it is
inconsistent with Congress’s intention in enacting the EPA to include in the
legislation an exception that allows employers to pay differing salaries for
reasons related to sex and because of sex. 67 Accepting any other definition
(such as any facially neutral factor), the court noted, would “perpetuate
rather than eliminate the pervasive discrimination at which the Act was
aimed.”68 Instead, the FOTS defense was understood from legislative
history to be included in the EPA because employers feared that their
58

Id.
Id.
60
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 873.
61
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468.
62
Id. at 460.
63
Id. at 467-68.
64
Id. at 458.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 459.
68
Id. at 460.
59
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legitimate business reasons for setting pay would not fall within the more
specific three defenses listed prior.69
While its conclusion was overruled, much of the court’s reasoning
in Kouba is still relevant to the EPA argument, and its rationale may still be
used by other courts in defining FOTS. In Kouba, the court considered
whether factors that traditionally discriminated against women, such as
using prior salary to determine current salary, are prohibited under the
EPA.70 The court said that the Act does not explicitly prohibit the use of
prior salary, but it is a factor that would have a disparate impact on women
based on historical wage discrimination.71 Thus, in order to qualify as a
factor other than sex to satisfy the fourth affirmative defense, use of prior
pay must sufficiently advance the business interests of the current
employer.72
The court said that the Act’s legislative history indicates two
competing policy concerns that Congress faced in adopting the legislation:
the need to uphold a private-enterprise system while establishing a fairness
in pay between men and women. 73 If applied correctly, the Act’s burdenshifting analysis and four affirmative defenses are a solution to these
competing interests.
In support of this, one writer argues that the vague language of this
fourth affirmative defense—compared to the stringent and specific nature
of the other defenses—reduces the defendant’s burden in the burdenshifting framework and makes it easier for employers to discriminate
against women in wage distribution. 74 In order to combat the ease of this
discriminatory behavior, another author argues that because Congress
placed a restriction on the exceptions—requiring that they be based on a
factor other than sex—a higher emphasis is placed on the fairness of pay
rather than the upholding of a private enterprise system. 75 This weighs in
favor of a more stringent interpretation of FOTS than mere gender
neutrality.76
The fact that no single approach has been determined hinders the
goal of eliminating the gender wage gap and allows for conflicting opinions
in the circuit courts. Because of the variances in interpretation, legislation
is necessary to guide lower courts’ decision-making in regard to sex-based
wage discrimination. While there have been multiple amendments
69

Id. at 464.
Id. at 468.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 463.
74
See Avery, supra note 17, at 868.
75
Id.
76
Id.
70
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proposed to Congress regarding sex-based wage discrimination, only one
amendment, the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, has been enacted. 77
Further, the amendment provides guidance only on the timing of bringing
a sex-based wage-discrimination claim.78 Because this Act is limited in
scope, more legislation is needed. However, all such legislation has failed,
as evidenced by the most recently proposed Paycheck Fairness Act in 2021,
discussed below.79
B. Proposed Amendments to the Equal Pay Act
The remaining amendments are proposed to the Equal Pay Act:
First, following the EPA, in 2019 the Paycheck Fairness Act aimed to
amend the FLSA.80 The Fair Pay Act of 2019 was subsequently introduced
to combat the continued existence of the gender wage gap. 81 Finally, the
Paycheck Fairness Act, originally introduced in 2019 as explained above,
was reintroduced in 2021.82

77

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
Id.
79
The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was proposed in order “to amend Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, PL 111-2, 111th
Cong. §1 (2009). The pivotal case that preceded the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., in which the Court discussed the time for filing
a charge of employment discrimination. 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007). In determining that the
time for filing begins at the time the discriminatory act takes place, the Court held that a
discriminatory charge “must be filed within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days,
depending on the state)” after the discriminatory act occurred. Id. at 621-24. A claim filed
outside of this time frame is not considered timely and may not be brought to the court. Id.
at 624. The Act specifically aimed to amend § 2000e-5, supplementing the Act with: “For
the purpose of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with respect to
discrimination in compensation in violation of this title, when a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject
to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
including each time wages, benefits or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in
part from such a decision or other practice.” Id. While this amendment is important in
expanding the possibility of bringing wage discrimination claims, the amendment does not
involve the defense against a wage discrimination claim. Specifically, the amendment does
not help clarify the fourth defense, from which most controversy arises.
80
Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
81
Fair Pay Act of 2019, H.R. 2039, 116th Cong. (2019).
82
Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R.7, 117th Cong. (2021).
78
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1. Paycheck Fairness Act of 2019
The Paycheck Fairness Act was introduced in order to amend the
FLSA “to provide . . . remedies to victims of discrimination in payment of
wages on the basis of sex . . . .”83 The amendment was introduced following
the determination that the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as adopted, was not
effective, and it accordingly proposed that amendments be made in order to
protect those subject to wage discrimination based on sex.84
The Paycheck Fairness Act proposed an amendment to strike the
“any factor other than sex” defense. 85 Instead, it proposed a bona fide factor
defense, to apply where an employer demonstrates that the factor the
differential is based off of (1) is not derived from a sex-based differential;
(2) is job-related; (3) is consistent with business necessity; and (4) is
responsible for the entire differential in wage rates between the male and
female employee.86 Therefore, the Act aims to clarify the interpretation of
the FOTS defense by providing a much more narrow defense in its place,
indicating the criteria such a factor must satisfy.
The House bill provides evidence suggesting that women continue
to earn lower wages than males for equal work, despite the enactment of
the EPA.87 The bill further states that “after controlling for educational
attainment, occupation, industry, union status, race, ethnicity, and laborforce experience roughly [forty] percent of the pay gap remains
unexplained.”88 The effect of such disparity (1) minimizes the wages of
working families who require the wages of all members in order to survive,
(2) reduces women’s retirement security, (3) reduces women’s economic
potential, (4) burdens commerce, (5) produces unfair competition in
commerce, (6) causes labor disputes, (7) disrupts fair marketing practices,
and (8) deprives employees of equal protection on the basis of sex, which
violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.89 After the failed attempt at amending the EPA by means of
the Paycheck Fairness Act, the Fair Pay Act of 2019 was proposed with a

83

Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “No
person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law… .” U.S.
Const. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall…deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” U.S. Const. amend. XIV,
§ 1.
84
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similar purpose: to eliminate the gender wage gap and to prohibit sex-based
wage discrimination.90
2. Fair Pay Act of 2019
Following the Paycheck Fairness Act, the Fair Pay Act of 2019 was
introduced in the House in order to prohibit discrimination in the payment
of wages on the basis of sex.91 The Act was introduced because of the
continued existence of wage disparity in equivalent jobs between
employees of different sexes, races, or national origins. 92 Similar to the
Paycheck Fairness Act, the Fair Pay Act of 2019 proposed to include an
amendment which would eliminate the “factor other than sex defense,”
prohibiting instead a wage differential for employees for work in equivalent
jobs unless the differential is based on a “bona fide factor other than
sex…such as education, training, or experience” (unless the factor is jobrelated or furthers a legitimate business interest purpose).93
As evidence of the need for this amendment, the House bill reported
that wage differentials exist in nearly all occupations. However,
traditionally-male-dominated jobs pay higher wages than traditionallyfemale-dominated jobs requiring the same skill, effort and responsibility
under similar working conditions.94 The proposed Act provided statistical
information: In 2015, a full-time white female employee earned eighty
cents for every dollar a full-time male earned; the gender wage gap can
therefore be said to exist across racial and educational lines. 95 While sixtytwo percent of the disparity is attributed to factors other than sex, a thirtyeight percent gap is not accounted for statistically, leading one to conclude
that discrimination on the basis of sex is responsible for the gap. 96
3. Paycheck Fairness Act of 2021
In January 2021, the Paycheck Fairness Act was reintroduced to the
House of Representatives and passed the House in April 2021. The Act
was introduced to amend the FLSA, as in 2019.97 Like the Act proposed in
2019, the Paycheck Fairness Act of 2021 was an amendment to strike the
90

Fair Pay Act of 2019, H.R. 2039, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 7, 117th Cong. (2021).
91
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“any factor other than sex” defense. 98 The language of the two Acts is
identical in nature.99 As the 2019 amendment aimed to do, this Act seeks
to clarify the interpretation of the FOTS defense by providing a narrower
defense in its place.
The Act failed in the Senate on June 8, 2021 by a 49-50 vote, with
one Senator abstaining. 100 So long as Congress continues to defeat equalpay legislation redefining FOTS, it is not likely that we can expect helpful
legislation surrounding the issue in the near future; the interpretation of
FOTS must therefore be left to the courts.
III. INCONSISTENCY OF JUDICIARY TO UPHOLD PURPOSE OF THE EQUAL
PAY ACT
As discussed above, the gender wage gap continues to exist, at least
in part, because of the courts’ inability to consistently apply the EPA and
Title VII FOTS defense. In failing to uniformly apply this defense, the
judiciary similarly fails to uphold the EPA’s goal of mitigating pay
discrimination based on gender.101 In analyzing these inconsistencies, this
Article will look more specifically at the burden-shifting analysis under
both the EPA and Title VII. First, the Article will briefly discuss the
plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prima facie case. The Article will then
compare the plaintiff’s burden to the defendant’s burden. Next, it will
discuss two approaches that courts take in interpreting the FOTS defense:
the gender-neutral test and the job-relatedness theory. Finally, the Article
will conclude with suggestions for how to reduce the inconsistencies—first
at the legislative level, then within the court system—all while achieving
the purpose of the EPA generally.
A. Plaintiff’s Burden: Prima Facie Case under the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII
To bring a claim under the EPA, the plaintiff must show, “that an
employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility and which are performed under similar working
conditions.’”102
98
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In acknowledging the equal pay for equal work requirement under
the EPA, the plaintiff in Brennan v. Prince William Hospital Corporation
brought suit against the defendant-hospital, claiming that male orderlies and
female nurses’ aides were not paid in conformance with the EPA. 103 While
the district court dismissed the claim for a failure to show the two positions
were considered equal work, the court of appeals reversed, finding that the
district court gave ‘undue significance’ to the job differences.104 The
question, the court said, is whether the plaintiff proved “substantial equality
of skill, effort, and responsibility as the jobs are actually performed.”105
While the existence of additional tasks may, in the court’s opinion, be
responsible for the pay disparity, it may not be used by an employer to
“mask the existence of wage discrimination based on sex.”106 In contrast
to this argument by an employer, a plaintiff may then show that the
increased pay is not related to the existence of additional tasks and is
therefore not justified.107 Despite the fact that the work performed by both
the aides and orderlies in question was not identical, the court held that the
EPA does not require identical work, but equal work.108 In finding this, the
court noted that the basic, routine tasks of the male and female positions
were equal, and therefore satisfied the equal work requirement under the
EPA.109
Unlike the EPA, under Title VII the plaintiff generally has to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in pay in the usual
manner of doing so. Generally, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green.110 The plaintiff, who
bears the initial burden, is not required to show equal work.111 The burden
then shifts to the defendant, although courts differ on whether the burden is
one of production or persuasion at this point, as discussed briefly below.112
The Fifth Circuit describes these burdens, stating that a plaintiff
makes a prima facie case, “by showing that an employer compensates
employees differently for equal work.”113 The defendant then “show[s] by
103
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a preponderance of the evidence that the differential in pay was made
pursuant to one of the four enumerated exceptions.”114
The court describes the relationship between these burdens
under the EPA and Title VII, stating that:
The allocation of burdens in EPA and Title VII claims,
however, differ in a way that may, in some cases, result in
an employee prevailing on her EPA claim but not
her Title VII claim. Specifically, where a plaintiff makes an
adequate prima facie case for both an EPA and
a Title VII claim, the defendant bears the burden
of persuasion to prove a defense under the EPA, whereas it
has only a burden of production to show a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions under Title VII,
with the ultimate burden of persuasion remaining with the
plaintiff. As such, where the defendant proffers a reason for
its pay differential other than sex but does not prove that
reason by a preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff will
succeed on an EPA claim while still bearing the burden of
persuasion under Title VII.115
As discussed above, it is not clear whether a plaintiff may bring a
disparate impact claim, because if the FOTS defense is interpreted as any
neutral factor other than sex, disparate impact would be precluded. 116
However, if the FOTS must be justified, the plaintiff may be able to prove
a case of disparate impact. 117 It is likely that the case would be similar to a
disparate impact case under the ADEA.118 The Court acknowledged in
Smith that Congress was aware of the relationship between the ADEA and
the EPA, stating that “when Congress uses the same language in two
statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly
after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text
to have the same meaning in both statutes.”119 Therefore, assuming
disparate impact is allowed, it will be probably interpreted consistently with
Smith.120 To satisfy her burden, the plaintiff would have to prove a prima
facie case that the FOTS asserted by the defendant-employer has a disparate
114
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impact.121 The defendant would then have the burden of persuasion to
prove FOTS.122 The plaintiff would not have the ability to prove a less
discriminatory alternative.123
B. Defendant’s Burden: Available Affirmative Defenses
Following the plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prima facie case
under the EPA, the defendant shoulders the burden of persuasion.124 The
employer bears the burden of showing that the pay discrepancy between
males and females is the result of a factor other than sex or one of the other
three available affirmative defenses. 125 The courts have determined that
“[a]n employer [must] submit evidence from which a reasonable factfinder
could conclude not simply that the employer’s proffered
reasons could explain the wage disparity, but that the proffered reasons do
in fact explain the wage disparity.”126
Some courts have recognized a difference in a burden-shifting
analysis under Title VII, as opposed to the EPA. For example, the Fifth
Circuit has held that an employer has the burden of both persuasion and
production under the EPA.127 The burden of persuasion shifts under the
EPA from the plaintiff to the defendant. 128 However, where a wage
discrimination claim is brought under Title VII, the Fifth Circuit has said
that the McDonnell Douglas framework must be followed; after a defendant
articulates a defense, the burden of production then shifts back to the
plaintiff—who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the case—to
show pretext.129 In other words, the defendant does not bear the burden of
persuasion to prove a defense under Title VII as he does under the EPA.
This may be another obstacle to the plaintiff’s ability to prosecute a wage
discrimination case. However, the main concern of this Comment is that
where a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, courts generally analyze
the FOTS defense differently. They use two different tests, creating
inconsistent decisions and uncertainty among plaintiffs bringing claims
under the EPA.130 This inconsistency appears to contribute to the continued
121
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pay discrepancy between male and female employees. As mentioned
above, the two methods of application are the gender-neutrality test and the
legitimate-business purpose test.
1. Fourth Affirmative Defense “Factor Other Than Sex”: Gender
Neutrality Requirement
As stated, the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this issue.
However, the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the “any other
factor other than sex” means just that— any factor other than sex.
A defendant’s burden of proof is reduced by this broad approach to
the defense. Instead of having to show that the factor responsible for the
pay disparity fell within a specific criterion, such as job-relatedness, the
defendant employer must merely show that the factor other than sex which
is responsible for the pay disparity is facially gender-neutral.131 The
defendant need not show a business purpose for the act’s being deemed
discriminatory by the plaintiff; he need only assert any factor which is not
facially discriminatory. This interpretation has been determined by the
Ninth Circuit to be “incompatible with the [EPA]” and as “tolerat[ing] all
but the most blatant discrimination.”132
In Kouba, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s defense of its
discriminatory practice resulted from its reading of FOTS to mean “any
factor that does not refer on its face to an employee’s gender or does not
result in all women having lower salaries than men.” 133 Further, courts have
openly disfavored this “catchall” interpretation of the FOTS defense,
explaining that doing so would allow a defendant “to defend a sex-based
salary differential on the basis of the very sex-based salary differentials the
Equal Pay Act was designed to cure.”134
While the Supreme Court has, in dicta, weighed in favor of this
gender-neutral test and the broad application of the FOTS defense under
both the EPA and Title VII, the interpretation fails to uphold the purpose of
the EPA. The EPA aims to prevent pay discrepancy based on gender, but
by lessening the defendant’s burden, employers can avoid liability under
the EPA or Title VII using the FOTS defense. This allows for sex-based
wage discrimination to continue due to the disproportionate ease of
defendants in satisfying their burden under the burden-shifting analysis.
The Seventh Circuit articulated its requirement that the employer
offer, not necessarily a “good reason” for the wage differential, but a bona
131

See Avery, supra note 17, at 864.
Kouba, 691 F.2d at 876.
133
Id.
134
Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457.
132

216

2022]

WAGE DISPARITY BASED ON SEX

217

fide, gender-neutral justification for the differential, applied in good
faith.135
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in analyzing the legislative history of
the FOTS defense, argued that defense’s history supports a broad
interpretation following the three specific defenses listed before it.136 The
court stated that it was “reluctant to establish any per se limitations to the
‘factor other than sex’ exception by carving out specific, non-gender-based
factors for exclusion from the exception.”137
2. Fourth Affirmative Defense “Factor Other Than Sex”: Job Relatedness
& Business Reason Requirement
The Supreme Court has seemingly approved the gender-neutral
interpretation of FOTS in dicta, as noted above. 138 In one of those cases,
Smith v. City of Jackson, the case was brought under the ADEA, which
requires a reasonable factor other than age as a defense to age
discrimination.139 The Court held that the reasonable-factor-other-than-age
defense may not be any neutral factor but must be reasonable—presenting,
in dicta, a contradiction to the FOTS defense which likely does not.140
Contrary to the reasonable-factor-other-than-age defense available under
the ADEA, under both the EPA and Title VII, as written, FOTS does not
include the word “reasonable” in the statute.141 Multiple circuit courts,
however, including the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the interpretation described in Smith,
instead applying the more stringent legitimate business-purpose test or jobrelatedness test.
Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Company is significant to the analysis
of the legitimate business purpose test, which requires that the defendant
have a legitimate business purpose for the claimed discriminatory factor.
Although the court’s treatment of the FOTS defense under this test was
overruled by Rizo v. Yovino, Kouba provides one method to analyze FOTS,
which was cited for many years. In Kouba, the court noted that the FOTS
defense requires a showing that the employer had an acceptable business
135
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reason for its actions. 142 The factor responsible for the pay disparity must
advance the business interests of the employer. 143
In Kouba, the defendant-employer, Allstate Insurance Co.,
computed new insurance agents’ salaries based on their “ability, education,
experience, and prior salary.” 144 During training, agents received the
minimum of that compensation, but upon completion of training, agents
received the remaining compensation and commissions earned during the
course of the training program.145 This resulted in women earning less than
their male-agent counterparts.146 The plaintiff argued that the use of prior
salaries in determining compensation is discriminatory; Allstate contended
that the use fell within the FOTS exception.147 In justifying its holding, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out that the EPA is concerned only with business
practices and that allowing an employer to use a factor that “rests on some
consideration unrelated to business” would be contrary to the purpose of
the EPA.148 But the court further acknowledged the reverse of that
argument, stating that “a factor used to effectuate some business policy is
not prohibited simply because a wage differential results.” 149
As discussed in detail, the Ninth Circuit applies a stringent, jobrelatedness test, defined in Rizo, that overrules Kouba’s150 holding that a
factor such as prior salary would not be acceptable due to the historical
systemic discrimination in pay between men and women.151
Similarly, in Aldrich v. Randolph Center School District the Second
Circuit determined that in order to establish a factor other than sex under
Title VII and the EPA, an employer must prove that “a bona fide businessrelated reason exists for using a gender-neutral factor that results in a wage
differential.”152
The Fourth Circuit, in EEOC v. MD Insurance Administration, also
followed a stringent interpretation of FOTS and held that “qualifications,
certifications, and employment history fall within the scope of the fourth
affirmative defense.”153
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The Eleventh Circuit, in Glenn v. General Motors Corporation,
analyzed the legislative history of the EPA and concluded that FOTS
“applies when the disparity results from unique characteristics of the same
job; from an individual's experience, training, or ability; or from special
exigent circumstances connected with the business.”154 While not
explicitly stating a job-relatedness standard, the Fourth Circuit therefore
limits the factors available under the defense relative to the business. Rizo
cited Glenn as support for its conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit requires
“job-related factors.”155
In citing Gunther, the Fifth Circuit made clear that the FOTS
defense applies “only where pay differentials are based on a bona fide use
of ‘factors other than sex.’”156 Additionally, the court held, “[a] practice is
not a bona fide [FOTS] if it is discriminatorily applied.”157 In describing a
standard, the Fifth Circuit in Browning v. Southwest Research Insurance,
adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of FOTS, stating that
“[f]actors other than sex include, among other things, employees'
‘[d]ifferent job levels, different skill levels, previous training, and
experience.’”158
In Beck-Wilson v. Principi, the Sixth Circuit adopted a similarly
stringent test, holding that the “Equal Pay Act's exception that
a factor other than sex can be an affirmative defense ‘does not include
literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a
legitimate business reason.’”159
The Tenth Circuit has held that the FOTS defense is a bona-fide,
gender-neutral pay classification system.160 But the court limits the
defense, stating that “such a classification system serves as a defense only
where any resulting difference in pay is ‘rooted in legitimate businessrelated differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the
particular positions at issue.’”161 The test described thus aligns closely with
Rizo.
In liberal contrast to the standard described in Rizo, less stringent
district courts located in the Third Circuit have held that
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“[a]cceptable factors other than sex include education, experience, prior
salary, or any other factor related to performance of the job.”162
Under the job-relatedness or business reason definition of FOTS,
the defendant is less likely to escape liability when discriminating against
an employee based on his or her sex. Congress likely intended such
interpretation, considering those factors which are related to job
requirements.163 In arguing this, one scholar claims that the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor (the division that administers and
enforces the EPA) has interpreted FOTS to include factors that measure an
employee’s ability and performance in his or her job.164
So long as the courts’ interpretations differ, legislation for
discrimination on the basis of sex is necessary to universalize courts’
application of the FOTS defense and to reduce the wage gap; but this seems
highly unlikely. While it is necessary to uphold the purpose of the EPA and
the intentions of Congressional agencies, additional efforts at the circuit
court level to streamline the interpretation may achieve a similar goal.
Requiring that a defendant raise a more specific FOTS defense increases
his burden to a level more akin to that of a plaintiff. Under the current legal
framework, plaintiffs have a greater burden in establishing a prima facie
case and in persuading the court that a defendant’s reason for its actions
was discriminatory; the defendant, on the other hand, need only raise a
defense showing any factor that could have been responsible for its decision
to pay the plaintiff a lower salary than her male counterpart.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the court in Rizo acknowledged, “the financial exploitation of
working women embodied by the gender pay gap continues to be an
embarrassing reality of our economy.”165 Ultimately, further legislation is
necessary to advance the goals of the EPA and to reduce the embarrassment
of an ever-present gender wage gap in our society. The Supreme Court
opined in dicta that the FOTS defense should be interpreted using a genderneutrality test; however, such a test hinders the plaintiff by allowing
defendant employers greater deference in providing reasons for the
disparity. Ideally, to combat this interpretation, Congress must take
legislative action in order to further its initial purpose in drafting the EPA.
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Both the Supreme Court and the lower courts need a plain language
requirement of a business-reason interpretation of the FOTS defense.
While a defined interpretation at the legislative level is ideal,
Congress’s recent failed attempts at defining FOTS have made it clear that
a legislative solution from Congress is unlikely. It is therefore the
responsibility of the courts to do so. In interpreting and applying the FOTS
defense, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, requiring
that the FOTS responsible for the pay disparity be job-related.
The continued existence of the gender wage gap is due, in part at
least, to the differing interpretations of the FOTS defense language by the
court system. Depending on the jurisdiction in which an EPA claim is
brought, the outcomes are decided differently and inconsistently, leaving
plaintiffs with little confidence in bringing a suit against a discriminatory
employer.
Instead of following Supreme Court dicta, approving the genderneutral interpretation of FOTS, the courts should follow the approach that
furthers Congress’s original goals in enacting the EPA and apply the
legitimate business purpose test—requiring that the employer have a
legitimate, job-related factor, other than sex, that is responsible for the
difference in pay between male and female employees; “any” factor will
not do. Such an interpretation aids in upholding the EPA’s intent to end
wage discrimination on the basis of sex, thereby furthering gender equality.
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